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Stoic philosophers had to face the accusation of incoherence, self-contradiction and Paradoxes 
since ancient times. Plutarch in his Moralia writes against them; Cicero devotes a separate work 
on stoic paradoxes (Paradoxa stoicorum). Even in contemporary Literature there are still 
discussions on the possibility of such an incoherence and existence of paradoxes in the stoic 
theory. 
 
At first glance, stoic Cosmology gives the impression to both (paradoxically) accept a kind of 
Determinism, and at the same time it undoubtedly argues for the moral agent’s freedom of the 
Will. In pre-stoic or even other contemporary to Stoicism Philosophical Traditions, the 
definitions that these two terms/concepts are given, fairly accuse as incoherent any Theory that 
does not set them as “contraries”. Under these types of accusations, the stoic Cosmology and 
Theory of the Freedom of the Will is often to be included. 
 
This phenomenal self-contradiction inside the Principles of Stoicism becomes even more obvious 
in Epictetus, a philosopher of the Late Stoa. He is interested in practical ethics, thus the 
phenomenal contradiction gets more lucid. This would have augmented the criticism of the Stoic 
philosophy for incoherence, if Epictetus had not made his main philosophical aim/target 
(through the use of detailed ethical examples):  the clarification of how an agent’s Will can be 
(prohairesis/προαίρεσις) Free inside a Universe ruled by Fate/Destiny (Πεπρωμένη); namely, a 
Universe merely Determined by Nature’s/God’s Will.  
 
Epictetus’ originality appears in the way he interrelates the concept of Freedom (ἐλευθερία) of 
the Will with the concept of Destiny and Determinism, in order to accomplish their simultaneous 
co-existence. This approach guards him against being easily accused for incoherence and self-
contradiction. 
 
Through the unique way he understands and defines the Moral Agency, which is the agent’s 
internal state/condition/disposition (prohairesis) , he steers towards an integrated, 
accomplished, strong and coherent line of argument. This sturdy declaration is able to support 
the weight of the Consent to a Free Will (ἐλευθερία), and thus a certain kind Freedom (defined 
differently to the common conception of Freedom) of the moral agent. The excellence of this line 
of argument is that it can bear also the burden of the Consent to the phenomenally contrary 
concept of Determinism and Destiny (Πεπρωμένη).  
 
The elements used to the construction of this argument, which is stretched throughout the whole 
epictetean corpus (the Discourses and the Enchiridion/Manual as reported by Arrian, the 
Epictetus’ pupil) can be summarised to a few key concepts, which are: the things which are in our 
power (τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν) and the things which are not in our power (τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν), the concept of 
Freedom (ἐλευθερία). These concepts work towards his philosophical targeting, because of the 
special definition he gives them.   
 
Axiomatically Epictetus states that in order for man to be free, it is necessary to be liberated 
from what the body forces him to do. Desires, passions and beliefs are considered as elements 
which are external to the moral agent. The moral agent “shrinks” into the Will. Thus man has the 
capability to free himself from anything external to his Will (prohairesis) and therefore to 
harmonise his own Will to the Will of Nature/God; namely, to will what Nature/God wills and 
thus never conflict to the external facts (“ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν”: Diogenes Laert. VII 87). 
Consequently, Epictetus’ solution, is to include in the category of τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν anything that he 
defines as external to the prohairesis: the desires, beliefs, passions and in general anything the 
body entails, the external facts. Thus the prohairesis, remains unhindered and it is completely 
depended on man’s power (τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν); as characteristically Epictetus writes, “not even Zeus 
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 The aim of this dissertation is to elaborate on the issue of the freedom of the 
will as expressed by Epictetus, the stoic philosopher of the Late Stoa. 
 
 The subject of the free will is of central importance for every philosopher or 
school of philosophy. In the case of Stoicism however the importance is substantial 
since Nature/ God/ Destiny (Πεπρωμένη)/ law of nature or logos, is the life-giving, 
form-giving, and creating force that defines, governs, and brings everything together.  
 
 Nature in Stoicism has acquired a double meaning or otherwise a dualistic 
character1. It is both being (descriptive meaning) and must (evaluative meaning). It 
points being to us as a course of laws that are governed by a specific logos. Being is 
the model in proportion to which man has to adopt his micro-type and participating to 
nature character. The accordance of the human with Nature/ God is virtue itself, it is 
eudaimonia itself.  
 
 As a rational being, man is conformable to the rational structure and 
“behaviour” of Nature, hence man himself is responsible for his internal peace of 
mind, or discomfort and discomposure. Hence, since man becomes morally 
responsible it is logically and morally necessary to have the free will to choose if he is 
going to shoulder or not his responsibilities regarding the identification with the Will 
of Nature for the sake of eudaimonia.  
 
 In this dissertation it will be attempted to defend the stoic philosophical 
thought from the accusation of being inconsistent or contradictory2. To this purpose 
the argument on the basis of which stoic philosophy tries to harmonise determinism 
and freedom will be put forward and defended. Hence this is the fundamental 
proposal of this dissertation.  
 
 Since stoic philosophy has been present in the History of Philosophy for six 
centuries (3rd  century B.C – 3rd century A.D), it is not possible to explore the concept 
of freedom in every single philosopher. After all, each philosopher’s thinking and 




determinism and freedom are different, as well as the relevant axiomatic principles, 
conclusions, and their individual way they define these concepts.  
 
 For this reason the focus of this dissertation is going to be on Epictetus. This 
philosopher totally founded his line of arguments regarding freedom of will upon the 
concepts of: τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. These concepts are quite important in the 
History of Philosophy due to the philosophical dimension and the importance 
Epictetus has attributed to them.  
 
 In Chapter 1 the content of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν will be analysed in the 
frame of the stoic, epictetean in particular, philosophy. In Chapter 2, the focus will be 
in the particular content and targeting of these terms in Epictetus. In Chapter 3, a 
correlation of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν with the concept of Freedom will follow,  in 
order to evaluate the functionality and aptness of these terms towards the conclusion 
of the thinking of Epictetus, related to the assumption of a form of freedom of choice 
of man. Finally in Chapter 4, an axiomatic principle will be put into test, and the 
benefit of the successful defence of this principle will be both the establishing of the 
epictetean acceptance of the freedom of choice according to one’s will, as well as the 
validity of the line of arguments towards this final stance. A line of arguments based 
upon the concepts of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. This stance is tested both by arguments 
against it and for it, and is as follows: The necessity and sufficiency of the προαίρεσις 
in achieving freedom of will in the form of a freedom of choice of disposition. In the 
same chapter the most important issue-problem that arises in Epictetus, which is the 
possibility of coexistence of Determinism (Destiny/ Πεπρωμένη) and Freedom, will 











«Περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν» 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 “[…] ὁ ἀκώλυτος ἄνθρωπος ἐλεύθερος, ᾧ πρόχειρα τὰ πράγματα ὡς βούλεται. ὃν δ᾽ ἔστιν ἢ 
κωλῦσαι ἢ ἀναγκάσαι ἢ ἐμποδίσαι ἢ ἄκοντα εἴς τι ἐμβαλεῖν, δοῦλός ἐστιν.  
τίς δ᾽ ἀκώλυτος; ὁ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφιέμενος.  
τίνα δ᾽ ἀλλότρια; ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὔτ᾽ ἔχειν οὔτε μὴ ἔχειν οὔτε ποιὰ ἔχειν ἢ πῶς ἔχοντα. οὐκοῦν 
τὸ σῶμα ἀλλότριον, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἀλλότρια, ἡ κτῆσις ἀλλοτρία.  
ἂν οὖν τινι τούτων ὡς ἰδίῳ προσπαθῇς, δώσεις δίκας ἃς ἄξιον τὸν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐφιέμενον. αὕτη ἡ 
ὁδὸς ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας, [μόνῃ] τὸ δυνηθῆναί ποτ᾽ εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὅλης 
ψυχῆς τὸ 
 ἄγου δέ μ᾽, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ᾽ ἡ Πεπρωμένη, 
ὅποι ποθ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος.”  
 
This is translated as follows: 
“The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes 
them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances 
against his will, is a slave.  
But who is free from restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others.  
And what are the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power either to have or not 
to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner.  
Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) 
belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay the penalty 
which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this 
is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul  
Lead me, O Zeus, and thou 0 destiny, 
The way that I am bid by you to go.” (4.1.128-131)1 
 
   The understanding of the relation of what Epictetus calls the things which are in our 
power (τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν), and the things which are not in our power (τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) with 
the concept of Freedom (ἐλευθερία), is a fundamental precondition for the 





   One could deduce from the abstract above that, ἐλεύθερος is he who is ἀκώλυτος· 
ἀκώλυτος is “he who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others” (τά 
ἀλλότρια)· ἀλλότρια are these “which are not in our power either to have or not to 
have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner.”  
 
   In this chapter I will try to clarify the concept of τά ἀλλότρια, a concept necessary to 
understand, if we are to comprehend what is related to freedom in the teachings of 
Epictetus.  
 
   Regarding the issue of the things which are in our power (τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν), and the 
things which are not in our power (τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν), Epictetus dedicates to them the 
first chapter of “Book I” of the Discourses2, and also a large number of parts of his 
Discourses and Enchiridion.  
 
   The terms τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν - τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν are used in this manner for the first time by 
Epictetus. This expression could be associated to the Aristotelian “ἐφ' ἡμῖν”3, that 
occurs in various types in the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. Chrysippus 
had in mind the term “ἐφ’ ἡμῖν”, which is used in stoic philosophy in general, but he 
did not termed it as Epictetus does.4 
 
1.2. Τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν 
 
   Being occupied only with τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν will result to a life without obstacles and 
compulsion for man: “τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι φύσει ἐλεύθερα, ἀκώλυτα, 
ἀπαραπόδιστα”5. No person can harm them since, very simply, they depend only on 
us. Therefore if man is occupied only with what depends on him can gain freedom. 
 
   In the τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν belong the «ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα 
ἡμέτερα ἔργα∙»6, in the τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν «τὸ σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, δόξαι, ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἑνὶ 






1.3. The theory of Epictetus as an attempt to ‘realise’ the ‘capable of’ being a 
free soul from birth 
   
 What the soul contains belong also to τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν. It is only ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική  (the 
rational faculty)8, of all faculties (δυνάμεις) that is capable of understanding itself and 
all other faculties. This is a divine δύναμις given by the gods to man since they were 
not capable to render man completely free. With this offer of theirs, gods do not grant 
a ‘realised’ freedom to man, rather a ‘potential’ freedom that can be achieved through 
man’s effort. Gods, simply, give powers  and not active capabilities.  
 
 As an axiom thus, Epictetus regarding this issue considers the soul as being δυνάμει/ 
potentially free since it is a faculty that gods have granted to since birth: 
 
“But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your 
little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not 
yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I 
have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty 
of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will 
take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet 
with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person.” (G. Long)9 
 
   Since man has only powers available in his possession, then anything he might 
desire or abhor (ὀρεκτική τε καὶ ἐκκλιτικὴ δύναμις) and anything he pursues or avoids 
(ὁρμητική τε καὶ ἀφορμητικὴ δύναμις) is initially only potential (δυνάμει). A theory 
regarding the steps of this effort towards the realisation of what is potential is the 
philosophy Epictetus for τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. In addition, this theory of 
him encompasses also the notion of how, via understanding and practically 
implementing this distinction, one can achieve freedom. It is in the frame of this very 
pattern that the research on the concept of freedom should be perceived. 
 
1.4.1. The Rational Faculty (ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική) 
   As mentioned before, the rational faculty has a special place among the other 
faculties. It is able to both examine itself as well as all the other faculties (δυνάμεις). 




soul: (θεωρητική δύναμις) and, secondly, it is capable of approving (δοκιμαστικὴ 
δύναμις) or of disapproving (ἀποδοκιμαστική δύναμις).  
   The “other faculties” correspond to the different parts of the Soul. In the Stoic 
Psychology, the Soul (ψυχή) has eight parts or faculties (SVF, II.836: Aetius Plac. 
IV.21) 10: the ‘commanding/ governing faculty’ (ἡγεμονικόν or λογισμός), also called 
‘mind’ (νούς), the ‘voice’ (φωνᾶεν or φωνή), the ‘seed’ (σπέρμα) and the ‘five senses’ 
(αἰσθητήρια). Ἡγεμονικόν is the central and the controlling part of the Soul; because of 
this, it is likened to the control that a spider has over its web (SVF, II.879: Calcidius 
ad Timaeum cp. 220) or to the body of the octopus in relation to its tentacles (SVF, 
II.836: Aetius Plac. IV.21.2). 
   The ‘governing part’ has four different powers: It is able of producing ‘impressions’ 
(φαντασία), ‘impulses’ (ὁρμητική δύναμις or ὁρμή), ‘assents’ (συγκατάθεσις) and 
‘perceptions’ (αἴσθησις). The functions/ powers which are under the control of the 
‘commanding faculty’ are explained below, in more detail.11 
   Ὁρμητική δύναμις (as opposed to ἀφορμητικὴ δύναμις) is the Faculty, which has the 
power of either pursuing an object or avoiding it. It is that kind of desire or impulse 
that prompts to action. It is, therefore, that kind of desire, which defines the ethical 
subject’s “Realm of Praxis.”12  
 
   Ὁρεκτική δύναμις (as opposed to ἐκκλιτικὴ δύναμις) is the Faculty of either desire 
or aversion. This power is another kind of ‘desire’, better to be called an ‘appetite’, 
for it is what the ethical subject experiences as either pleasant or displeasing. It is 
what Gourinat defines as the “Realm of Passion.”13  
   Under the control of the ‘commanding faculty’ is also the power of using the 
appearances of things (δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις χρηστική) and the Assent 
(συγκατάθεσις  -  καταφρόνησις). Assent (συγκατάθεσις),14 is to either assent or dissent 
to an impression (φαντασία). Συγκατάθεσις is closely related to reason (λόγος); thus it 
is exclusive to (adult) humans. Having Reason, is an essential prerequisite to being 
able to assent or withhold assent from the appearances of things/ impressions. 




assenting to them or withholding their assent from them. Consequently, rationality or 
reason proves the existence of some kind of moral responsibility into the sphere of 
ethics and morality. Namely, through a careful reading of the Stoic Psychology, we 
can safely conclude that some kind of voluntary action (at least of the act of assent to 
impressions), and thus of moral responsibility, exists in humans. If this ‘voluntary 
assent’ to impressions can take the notion of ‘free will’ is what is less clear and needs 
further discussion, which takes place below.  
   The ability to form ‘concepts’ is derived from this rational - voluntary act to assent 
to impressions. Thus, rational impressions take the notion of beliefs and knowledge 
in the Epistemological Sphere. Correspondingly, in the Sphere of Ethics, the 
rationality of impulses constitutes a kind of ‘choice’; this is the ‘choice’ to 
voluntarily assent to or withhold assent from an impulsive impression. Impulses in the 
case of humans are thus defined as the choice of the one or the other way to act.    
1.4.2. Ἡ Δύναμις ἡ ταῖς φαντασίαις χρηστική 
          The role of God in the pursuit of a free soul    
   
   One of the powers of the rational-governing faculty (προαίρεσις), as already 
mentioned, is the δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις χρηστική15.  
 
   Humans are able to use their impressions (φαντασίαι) rationally. ‘Rational’ is what 
is conformable to Nature16.  Nature is as God chooses and wants17. Contrary to 
animals, humans do not simply receive and make use of the impressions, but are also 
able, firstly, to assent to or withhold assent from them and secondly, to understand 
them. By understanding them they can also memorize them and combine them in 
order to create new ‘intellectual’ impressions, such as concepts.18 These ‘intellectual’ 
impressions are opposed to the ‘sensual’ impressions that come straight, without any 
intellectual elaboration, from Nature-God, through the senses.  
 
   The understanding of the Works of God, makes humans not only spectators (θεατής) 
of His Works, but also interpreters (ἐξηγητής). In the frame of this rational the 
understanding of His Works renders also the understanding of ourselves, as part of 




 In consequence this implies that man should use the faculties he has in common 
with God since it is to this purpose that God has granted them to him. The individual 
human soul constitutes a part of the Whole; it is united with it, thus, since the Whole 
is the God, then every single human being is a part of Him.20 Therefore as E. Zeller 
observes: “It is a mere delusion to suppose that the soul possesses a freedom 
independent of the world’s course.” 21  
 
 In all the freedom of our partial souls harmonises with the freedom of the Universal 
Soul. Epictetus mentions in detail how man can achieve this harmonisation, and this 
will be analysed further on in the dissertation. This point of harmonisation is one of 
the fundamental proposals of Epictetus in relation to the emancipation of the soul. 
These faculties that man shares with God are summarised in the ‘Rational Faculty’ 
(λογική δύναμις or δύναμις χρηστική ταῖς φαντασίαις). 
 
   Generally, the ‘chief concern’ (Ὕλη)22 of the wise and good man is to use his  
φαντασίαι conformably to Nature (κατὰ φύσιν). This is achievable, only if man uses 
his Reason (the ‘Rational Faculty’). Living conformably to Nature, implies that man 
assents to Truth, he withholds assent from Falsehood, he is moved by a desire (ὄρεξις) 
of anything good and by an aversion (ἔκκλισις) from anything evil. 
 
1.4.3. Προαιρετική δύναμις or προαίρεσις (prohairesis; Will) 
 
   This term23 was used by a number of orators and philosophers; it was Aristotle 
however who employed it more persistently and then the Philosophers of the Early 
Stoa. In the case of Epictetus this term acquires a greatly central importance.  
   Προαιρετική δύναμις is the most powerful (τὸ κράτιστον)24 and the strongest 
(ἰσχυρότερον)25 of all the other faculties, which “not even Zeus himself can 
overpower.”26 The only possible obstacle27 to the Will is the Will itself, in the case 
that it turns against itself. Consequently, the Will is by itself a criterion of the good 
(ἀγαθόν) and therefore of the eudemonia (the ἀγαθόν, which is the virtue (ἀρετή), 





    Προαίρεσις is the main power of the ‘governing faculty’ (ἡγεμονικόν) which, as 
previously mentioned, is that part of the soul that locates the rational power (reason/ 
λογική δύναμις). It is therefore the predominantly rational faculty given by the gods to 
man as a potential freedom: 
 
“ἐλεύθερος γάρ ἐστιν, ᾧ γίνεται πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ὃν οὐδεὶς δύναται κωλῦσαι.”28 
 
   Προαίρεσις encompasses everything belonging to ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Nothing from οὐκ ἐφ' 
ἡμῖν, that is external things, can hinder it. Hence it is the predominant criterion for 
freedom, yet, under one condition: being free does not mean being able to choose 
anything I want, namely to will inconsiderately29. I have to be able to will things as 
they happen, and they happen as they have been determined to happen by God/ 
Nature. It would be meaningless to try to change “the constitution of things”, namely 
the facts; this is not in our power and thus it is not potential (we are not able to 
achieve it); what is possible to do is to act in such a way so that our Will is 
conformable (συνηρμοσμένη)30 to what is happening. 
 
   The punishment31 for those, who do not accept and do not harmonize with the 
constitution of things, is for them to remain ‘prisoners’ in the dissatisfying disposition 
they already are; dissatisfying because they can in no other way change it, and 
therefore they remain there against their Will, but still not being ready to compromise 
with the Will of Nature. It is therefore wrong to wait for a situation to adapt to our 
will. Rather we should try to adapt our will to the various situations. Through this 
way we can be happy since we will achieve the harmony between our will and the 
events; therefore we will want/will only what can be achieved. As Myrto Dragona – 
Monachou mentions “aversion from what is not in our power will guarantee us at least 
‘serenity’ and ‘a good flow of life’ that constitutes the stoic eudaimonia (1.4.1-4). The 
one who progresses on the path towards wisdom has been freed from desire and tries 








Content and targeting (aim) of ἐφ' ἡμῖν and οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν  
 
   What mainly differentiates the epictetean ‘stoic philosophy’, and thus the epictetean 
‘stoic approach’ to Freedom, from the ‘stoic philosophy’ of the other Stoics, is the 
way he relates the τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν with ἐλευθερία1. As S. Bobzien 
notes, “there is no evidence that the topics of freedom and of that which depends on 
us were connected in Stoic philosophy in any way before Epictetus”.2 The concepts of 
Freedom and of these which depend on us, have been both used in stoic philosophy 
before Epictetus, but they were nowhere related to each other that closely. In the 
philosophy of Epictetus they take a central role; the concept of ‘that which depends on 
us’ cannot be thought of separately from the concept of ‘Freedom’ and vice versa.  
 
 
2.1. The epictetean targeting 3 to the integration of the internal powers to 
the ἐφ' ἡμῖν and the external necessities to the οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν 
 
   At this point a fundamental distinction between the internal things will be made 
(those sub-jected: the faculties of the soul, i.e. desire, impulse etc) to a moral agent 
and those that are external to the moral agent (those that stand facing man: the 
external objects).  
 
   Susanne Bobzien in her comparative presentation4 of the various positions of the 
philosophy of morals introduces some fundamental distinctions. Initially she defines 
seven different kinds of freedom. The first three belong to the category she terms 
“indeterminist freedοm”5: freedom to do otherwise, freedom of decision, freedom of 
the will. She terms the fourth: “un-predeterminist freedom”6. The fifth, sixth, and 
seventh kind are in the general category she calls: “types of freedom compatible with 
both indeterminism and ‘un-predeterminism’”7: freedom from force and compulsion, 
freedom from determination by external causal factors, freedom from determination 
by (external and) certain internal causal factors.  
 
   This categorisation continuous with the presentation of two different perceptions 




   The first approach9 states that a moral agent is responsible for an action only if it 
has acted independently: “[…] considers it a necessary condition of praising or blaming an agent 
for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that was causally responsible for whether the 
action occurred. The contrast is between self-determination and other-determination to act. Actions or 
choices can be attributed to the agent because it is in them that the agents, qua rational or moral beings, 
manifest themselves. Some thinkers consider the un-predeterminedness of an action/ choice as a 
necessary condition for autonomy, and consequently for the attribution of moral appraisal.”10  
 
   The second approach to the moral responsibility issue, states that the moral agent is 
responsible for an action only if it could have acted in a different way: “[…] considers it 
a prerequisite for blaming or praising an agent for an action that the agent could have done otherwise. 
This idea is often connected with the agents’ sentiments or beliefs that they could have done otherwise, 
as well as the agents’ feelings of quilt or regret. Some philosophers consider the indeterminedness of an 
action/choice as a necessary condition for the guarantee that the agent could have done otherwise. The 
concepts of indeterminist freedom of an agent […] gain importance at the point at which moral 
appraisal is connected with the idea that at the very same time, the same agent, with the same beliefs 
and desires, could have done otherwise.”11  
 
   The first is the perception of moral responsibility that the ancient philosophers had. 
T. Brennan12 comments that in ancient philosophy the desires, predispositions, 
impulses, and the ‘beliefs’ of the moral agent were considered as something from 
which the moral agent could not escape, thus man he had to define his freedom within 
the frame allowed by this internal condition. It was thus something internal in 
relation to the agent. The moral agent, according to his description, was like a ‘thick 
ball’ consisting of desires, predispositions, impulses, and the ‘beliefs’. The only 
element external to these was the cosmos and everything it encompasses: animals, 
plants, inanimate objects and humans. There were however exceptions to this rule 
such as the case of Plato who considered the body and everything it entails (desires, 
impulsions, passions, etc) as slavery and coersion13.  
 
   In later philosophy it is the latter view that prevails. Desires, passions, beliefs etc are 
considered as an element external to the moral agent from which man can free 
himself from as he can free himself from all the rest external things and thus become 
free. The moral agent is independent and autonomous from his desires and ‘beliefs’; it 
is his very psychology / mental condition that allows him to “act otherwise also”. The 




moral agent can act in completely the opposite way in comparison to  the way he 
would act at another given  time but with the same desires and ‘beliefs’, because these 
desires and ‘beliefs’ do not force the moral agent  towards act x or the opposite one.  
 
    Brennan and Susanne Bobzien agree over this distinction. They disagree15, as to 
which should be the point of emphasis for the contrasting of ancient thinking with the 
modern one. 
 
   According to S. Bobzien, the difference between the two lines of thinking lies in the 
contrast between autonomy and the freedom to act differently.  
 
   According to T. Brennan the contrast lies in the content of the psychology attributed 
each time to the moral agent: “[…] it is a contrast between a psychologically rich and 
complicated self, whose autonomy consists in its ability to do otherwise, so far as the world outside the 
whole psychology goes, and an abstract and point-like self, whose autonomy consists in its ability to do 
otherwise, even so far as the agent’s own desires and preferences go. Or rather, the desires and 
preferences are no longer conceived as being the ‘agent’s own’, since they belong in the shell of 
psychology that is external to the point-like self.”16  
 
   Relatively to the ancient perception of the psychology of the agent he mentions 
among others: “[…] Ancient psychological theories always strove for complete explanatory power: 
understanding an agent’ s actions means seeing that given the beliefs and desires they had, they could 
not have acted otherwise than as they did. What makes the agent responsible for their actions is that the 
actions stemmed from the agent’s psychology, not from anywhere else. It is true, given those beliefs 
and desires, the agent could not have acted otherwise; but the action is still the agent’s action, because 
it came from the agent’s beliefs and desires. […] But the mere fact that the agent could not do  
otherwise, given their actual psychological state, does nothing to extricate them from responsibility for 
the things that they actually did. Autonomy, not the ability to do otherwise, is the issue. […] Of course, 
so far as my psychology goes, it may be that I am not capable of doing otherwise. My beliefs and 
desires may be such that I am psychologically compelled to stay in my room – given what I want and  
what I believe, it is not possible for me to do otherwise. But in antiquity, that is no threat to 
responsibility, because I am acting as an autonomous agent, unhindered by anything outside me.”17  
 
   Regarding the contemporary thinking on the same subject he writes: “If we now 
contrast this with the modern view, it should be clear that the difference in where I draw the boundaries 
of my self, or draw the boundaries around agents in general. Moral responsibility now requires that I be 




do otherwise. And this is a natural evolution of the ancient view, if we imagine a shrinking of the self, 
so that desires that were once thought of as internal to the agent come to be seen as external to the 
agent.”18 
 
 As for the freedom of will, in Epictetus the following change occurred, in relation to 
ancient philosophy, (however the essence of this change agrees with the philosophy of 
later eras)19: Epictetus contrary to Chrysippus and, in general, the Ancient Stoa, 
maintains that man as the  moral agent, is independent from his ‘beliefs’ and  desires. 
This means that he can treat them as something external and thus be liberated from 
them. The body for Epictetus, as well as for Plato and also for the Neo-Platonic 
philosophers is the agent of  the desires and passions that, on one hand  hinder man 
(according to Plato) from rising to the world of ideas and free himself from  the ties of 
the body. On the other hand (according to Epictetus) they hinder man from the ability 
to dedicate himself to his internal faculties and progress on the path towards wisdom 
(προκοπή20) through exercise to the extend he  will become free, hence virtuous and 
finally happy  too.  
 
 The solution for Epictetus is one and only, given the axiomatic preconditions and 
aims of his philosophy that were mentioned above: in order for man to be free – 
virtuous – happy it is necessary to be able to be liberated from what the body forces 
him to do21. The only way for Epictetus to defend this view is to distinguish things 
into the categories of τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν and οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and to include in the second 
category the necessities that derive from the Will and from the body (and everything it 
entails). Only thus he would be able to provide answers as to how these are to be 
treated in order to put them, as best as we can, in a secondary importance. By doing 
this we will gain freedom because we will have succeeded to deal only with the soul 
(that is what completely belongs to ἐφ' ἡμῖν). The philosophy of Epictetus lies exactly 
to the attempt to describe what he believes to be the most effective path to freedom, 
which, as it was explained above, is the one of capability; and it is this one, because 
the gods have offered us a number of capabilities (τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν) 22 which, if developed 






2.2. The distinctiveness of the content and the targeting of ἐφ' ἡμῖν and οὐκ 
ἐφ' ἡμῖν in Epictetus  
 
   In order to clarify the distinct character of these concepts in Epictetus I will be 
presenting them comparatively to the perception of Chrysippus, one of the most 
typical philosophers of the Ancient Stoa. 
 
   Chrysippus’ perception of these two concepts is quite different than that of 
Epictetus, both regarding their content and their targeting23. 
 
   Firstly, while Chrysippus places emphasis on the factor of causality, and the moral 
agent and also to what extend the agent assents or not to the external “impressions”, 
Epictetus only provides definitions for the moral agent, such as κύριος and 
αὐτεξούσιος. Secondly, Chrysippus considers that in order to decide if something 
depends on us, we have to examine each specific case as it occurs every time: 
Something depends on us if at the present moment there are no obstacles to hinder its 
realisation. The existence of obstacles will appear only if we attempt to act. On the 
other hand, Epictetus categorises a series of events that definitely depend on us in 
every possible case. He wants to ensure that the external factors, natural or human, 
will never remove from our control the specific group of things that are on our power, 
whose content he specifies. In other words he wants to establish an “ἐφ' ἡμῖν” of 
stable content that in every circumstance will remain “ἐφ' ἡμῖν”.  
 
   From the above one can observe that the difference between the two philosophers 
concerns the content, but mainly the targeting. It is this targeting that differentiates the 
philosophy of Epictetus from the rest of the Stoics. In order for Epictetus to define the 
ἐφ' ἡμῖν he sets as a criterion and precondition, the safeguarding of a serene, tranquil 
and in general well constituted internal condition-disposition of the moral agent. This 
approach responds completely to the realities of the Hellenistic Era and the needs of 
the people that were crushed under the monstrous Roman Empire. The indisputable 
dependence of certain things on the moral agent alone could guarantee to the man of 
that era, (an era when everything would change from day to day), that he could build 








 Further on I am presenting a selection of interpretations that scholars of 
ancient philosophy put forward and with which I agree. 
 
   W. L. Davidson writes: “[…] the Stoics made desire and the right handling of it 
practically the centre of their system.”24  
 
   The way that M. Dragona – Monachou presents this change in targeting is quite to 
the point: “[…] with the narrowing of the margins of the act as a manifestation of 
creative freedom which starts from the prohairesis, the prohairesis in Epictetus 
becomes an internalised act, a free choice of life disposition (attitude), an expression 
of the soul and of the moral will […]”.25  
 
   S. Bobzien provides a similar interpretation of this issue: “For Epictetus, the notion 
of that which depends on us serves – on the basis of an already established theory of 
morals – a predominantly practical purpose. It has its role within ethics. It is intended 
to provide a means that helps people to plan and lead a good and undisturbed life. Its 
primary function is guidance of life and actions.”26 
 
   The same view is also held by A. A. Long: “[…] Stoics require their adherents to 
treat their pre-philosophical selves as shifted out of dominant social values to the 
detriment of what human nature actually requires of them. The schools’ common 
emphasis on austerity and frugality is not simply a recommendation to prune one’s 
diet and give up unnecessary luxuries, but an invitation to enter an alternative world 
and acquire a new self. […] for the purpose of a reconstructed self which will view 
the world with eyes undiverted by passion.”27  
 
   Finally, G. Koumakis interrelates the peaceful and serene emotional condition with 
freedom, education and well being. The targeting of the philosophy of Epictetus 




philosophy should be perceived as a functional term towards this specific targeting. 
This applies for the terms τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, as well. 
 
“Every human being tries to achieve the supreme good and the virtues, such as ‘ataraxy’ (serenity), 
‘aphobia’ (fearlessness) and freedom, thus leading himself to happiness which is the final purpose of 
human action. […] The argument upon which Epictetus bases the view that education helps create 
freedom rests upon his definition of freedom. ‘Freedom is to live as you wish’. […] A free man is he 
who lives just as he wishes, and nobody wishes to be in fear, disturbance or sorrow. Consequently, 
nobody who is disturbed, afraid or sorry is free. It follows from this assertion that free man is neither 
afraid, neither sorry nor disturbed. Education is the instrument that releases one from fear, disturbance 
and sorrow and, therefore, it renders him/her free. (Epictetus, Dissertations, II, 1, 21-25). […] 




























The relationship of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν with ἐλευθερία 
 
 In this short chapter the correlation of these two most fundamental concepts in 
Epictetus’ teachings will be analysed: on one hand the concept of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' 
ἡμῖν and on the other that of ἐλευθερία. As I have mentioned, Epictetus is the first 
philosopher that correlated the concepts of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν with ἐλευθερία in 
such a way and so closely. For the analysis of this correlation I will be based on 
observations of mine and the relevant to this subject analysis by Susanne Bobzien1.  
 
 According to Epictetus there are two preconditions in order to achieve freedom. The 
first one is a cognitive precondition: man should know what belongs and what does 
belong to τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν. The second precondition is a moral one: it regards the 
adjustment of our desires, and our way of life in general, in the frame of our 
cognitive-theoretical education to the τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν. This means to limit ourselves to the 
faculties that God granted to us, which are included in the Commanding-faculty; these 
are: the προαίρεσις that is analysed in the use of the impressions, the desire, the 
impulse and the reason. 
 
 Such a correlation can be made only if what Epictetus means with the concept of τά 
ἐφ' ἡμῖν is understood correctly. Other philosophers also employ this concept but do 
not imply such a kind of relationship. Chrysippus is an example of this. He maintains 
that there does not exist a consistent group of things that belong to the τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν but 
that each time, they are specified by the current circumstances and external obstacles 
the agent encounters. 
 
   For Epictetus, as well as for the ancient Stoics, there does not exist a wider spectrum 
of things that belong to the τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν for the Sage, in relation to the other people. 
The difference is that the ‘common persons’ do not succeed in the first cognitive2 
precondition. Still they are as morally responsible for their actions as the wise person 
is, who is free by definition. Therefore the lack of freedom cannot constitute an alibi 
for the moral responsibility of the agent. Epictetus documents very well his view 









The epictetean προαίρεσις as the freedom of choice of the 
internal disposition 
 
 The above axiom, which is used as a title, is the key point regarding the defence or 
negation both of the margins for freedom that Epictetus leaves and of the way he 
proposes towards Freedom. (This way has been explained in the previous chapters 
and in short it concerns the correlation between ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and 
ἐλευθερία.)  
 
4.1. In support of this stance 
 
   According to the view of Epictetus, nothing can hinder1 προαίρεσις. There can be 
obstacles only for the body and everything else that belongs to the οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, that 
is all those that are ἀπροαίρετα. The “τά τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς προαιρέσεως”2 are considered 
as neither “τί ἀγαθόν” nor “τί κακόν”; they are just ἀδιάφορα (indifferent: neither 
good nor bad). Thus if man acts according to his προαίρεσις, then he will be limited to 
those of the “τά τῆς προαιρέσεως”, where there is no obstacle. Though this way he 
gains freedom.3 Freedom requires the following condition: to be limited to the “τά τῆς 
προαιρέσεως”; whoever is not willing to abide by this condition has only one option: 
lack of freedom.  
 
   This is the prison and the punishment4 of any person that could not accept and play 
the role that was given to the Whole. The Whole/ the Universe in its totality is a 
festival in which everyone gives his performance. God has no need of any 
“discontented spectator”5 of His Works; he only “needs” those who will join Him to 
the festival (πανήγυρις), and accept his terms regarding what belongs only to Him. He 
will gladly see those, who do not enjoy, to leave the festival6 (that is the life itself), by 




case, they do not participate to the capabilities/ powers7 granted to them by God, one 
of which is freedom. After all, they have chosen not to be free even if they live, hence 
their lives are not greatly different from not been alive.  
 
   Everything that has been given to man is for him to use8 it in conformity to the will 
of the one who has lent it (ὁ χρήσας) to him, which is God. Moreover, the one who 
sets his face against God, trying to force a more powerful entity than him, is more 
unjust9 than an idiot; and being unjust is much more to blame. Unjust to the entity to 
which he should at least be grateful. Because God could have been very unfair, if he 
had chosen to lend him only what does not depend on him: namely, a non freedom of 
choice, by not offering to him anything from those that He has rendered dependable to 
him (which give him the opportunity to acquire them). If someone has lent something 
to you he is entitled to take it away from you at any time and under any terms he 
wishes, because he is the one who willingly has lent it to you. He has brought you to 
the world at the time He wished and with the faculties/powers He wished: “οὐχὶ 
ἐκεῖνός σε εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχὶ τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνός σοι ἔδειξεν; οὐ συνεργοὺς δέδωκεν; οὐ 
καὶ αἰσθήσεις; οὐ λόγον; ὡς τίνα δὲ εἰσήγαγεν; οὐχ ὡς θνητόν; οὐχ ὡς μετὰ ὀλίγου 
σαρκιδίου ζήσοντα ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ θεασόμενον τὴν διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ καὶ συμπομπεύσοντα 
αὐτῷ καὶ συνεορτάσοντα πρὸς ὀλίγον;”10 
    These are the faculties/powers that in contemporary philosophy are summarised in 
the term ‘Will’, mainly by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, meaning a human Will that 
necessarily remains human and limits the freedom of its agent (man) within the 
boundaries of the human idiosyncrasy and essence; in other words into the dimensions 
and properties that this Will has the ability to stretch and extent itself. 
 
   I believe that the difference is that in the case of contemporary philosophy the Will 
is a kind of ‘corporeal προαίρεσις’: namely, a consequence of what the body can/is 
able to. The mental powers constitute a part of the body in the sense that they are 
constrained, forced and imprisoned in all those that the body wills/ is able to.   
 
   For the ancients it was a ‘προαίρεσις of the psyche’, the outcome of an internal 
disposition / choice. It (the προαίρεσις) also included the choice of all of the things 




previous chapters, the ancients believed that the human προαίρεσις,  which is nothing 
but a faculty / power of the soul, can choose to be indifferent towards external things, 
(including the body), in the same way it can choose indifference towards internal 
things, which are the properties /faculties /powers of the soul: impulse, desire, assent, 
etc. In other words in the frame of ancient thinking the body and all the objects that 
are outside of the soul (contrary to the above modern pattern) were considered as part 
of the soul in the sense that they are constrained, forced and imprisoned in all that the 
soul wills/ is able to/ προαίρεται.   
 
4.2.1. Negation of this stance 
 
 One could raise a serious objection to all the above, like the one Cicero raises, 
among others. I will first present it and then I will attempt, on the basis of the 
arguments and viewpoints of Epictetus, to show that it can be overpassed: 
 
 “They argue in this manner: - If all happens by fate, then every effect is determined by an anterior 
cause. If appetite be allowed, those things also must be allowed which follow appetite: and on the same 
principle thus it is with our sentiments. But if the cause of appetite does not depend on us, then, even 
the appetite itself is no longer in our power. If the affair stands thus, the effects produced by appetite 
are no longer chargeable on ourselves. Thus we lose all command both of our sentiments and actions. 
From which it follows that all praise and blame must be equally unjust, and all honours and 
punishments. And as this consequence is absurd, they conclude with much probability that all the 
events which happen are not the effects of fate.”11  
 
4.2.2. Moral Intension and Moral Responsibility 
 
«[…] Sur les tables d’airain où notre loi se grave, 
« Vous effacez le nom de la FATALITÉ, 
« Vous déliez les pieds de l’Homme notre esclave. 
 
« Qui va porter le poids dont s’est épouvanté 
« Tout ce qui fut créé ? ce poids sur la pensée, 
« Dont le nom est en bas : RESPONSABILITÉ ?»12 
    
 This objection leads to a capital problem regarding both the Philosophy in general 
and also the individual philosophers and schools: the problem of moral intension, 





 Epictetus refers to this issue not by using the term of ‘moral responsibility’ but 
indirectly by using the terms: ψόγος, ἔπαινος, ὑπεύθυνος. 
 
   The precondition for such a moral judgement to be made, is the agent to take moral 
responsibilities, hence have opinions and wills (ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα) only for what 
the gods have made him responsible of (ὑπεύθυνον),14 that is all that depend on him. 
Otherwise the moral judgment has no meaning, is out of place. We cannot judge 
someone for what he cannot assent and desire, because since he is not even able for 
these there is no room for moral judgment on these; he cannot be predisposed to them 
either in the right or in the wrong manner. 
 
 If the above precondition is met then we proceed to the moral judgment. Moral 
judgment has its own rules/criteria according to Epictetus: We blame or praise 
someone with the only criterion15 being this: whether his deed (ἔργον) resulted from 
an appropriate or not use of what he has under his moral responsibility. The 
προαιρετικόν and any power it includes (ὁρμὴ, ὄρεξις, συγκατάθεσις, δύναμις ταῖς 
φαντασίαις χρηστική), is “ἀκώλυτον ἀνανάγκαστον ἀπαραπόδιστον”16 because it is 
only for this that gods hold man ὑπεύθυνον. Therefore only the above belong to the 
ἐφ' ἡμῖν, which are the things that we are able of realising/achieving at a moral 
burden/price, namely in a correct or wrong way.  
 Epictetus limits the ἐφ' ἡμῖν mainly to the use of impressions (φαντασίαι) and 
generally in our opinions and wills (ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα), because he believes that 
the final outcome of a series of actions does not fully depend on us. 
 
 In other words what is accountable for Epictetus is the moral intension/disposition; 
the maintenance of προαίρεσις close to the good, to what is in accordance with nature. 
I think that the analysis of the moral intent provided by Myrto Dragona – Monachou 
is very much to the point:  
 
“The moral intention guaranties the ‘appropriate’ type of the condition of the soul, the specific quality 
of the character, the rigid moral, the good moral/ethos thus the essence of human good (1.8.16). […] 
Proairesis is also the resultant of the ‘opinions for the external’ and is accordingly good or evil (3.2.13). 




deontological judgment, equivalent to the ‘opinion’ (1.17.27) and the ‘use of impressions (φαντασίαι)’ 
(2.23.6-7), namely  the ‘Rational Faculty/Reason’ (1.1.4-6) […]”.17   
 
 
4.2.3. The internal moral disposition of the moral agent  
 
 What will be analysed in the following chapters is the response of the Stoics, 
Epictetus in particular, to the question of moral responsibility mentioned before, and 
also to the main objection: whether the prohairesis in the theory of Epictetus leads to 
a freedom of choice of disposition. 
 
4.2.4. Προαίρεσις – Soul –Man – Individual/ Self Identity/ Person (πρόσωπον)  
 
   Προαίρεσις is the man himself; retelling this in terms Aristotle would use, we could 
say that προαίρεσις is the essence/ definition of man. In stoic terms, προαίρεσις is the 
general end or purpose of man18. As I aforementioned, what differentiates man from 
animals is the rationality of the soul (λογική δύναμις); using again Aristotelian terms, 
this could mean that the body is nothing but a συμβεβηκὸς ('accident'). Thus, all the 
powers (δυνάμεις) of man are “placed” into the soul; and more specifically, they are 
foregathered into the commanding-faculty of the soul, which is προαίρεσις.  
 
   Epictetus poses the following question: “Πόθεν οὖν αἰσθησόμεθα τοῦ κατὰ 
πρόσωπον ἕκαστος;”19 The response he himself gives, is that each man is able to 
understand the powers he owns, or in other words, his ‘character.’20 This is because 
each one comes to know his own powers, through their outcomes. In order, however, 
for these powers to be able to produce results, that is to become reality, what is 
needed is exercise (άσκηση), preparation (παρασκευή) and discipline (παιδεία), in 
order for us to we know what depends on us and what does not, so as not to exhaust 
ourselves to efforts and waste our powers for the οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Therefore the 
knowledge regarding προαίρεσις renders man an individual human being21.  
 
4.2.5. The internal moral disposition of the moral agent as the primary cause 





 What is elaborated in this chapter is how from the concept of the ‘Individual/ Self 
Identity/ Person (πρόσωπον)’ we can come to conclusions regarding the moral 
disposition of the moral agent:    
 
“By the time of Roman Stoicism, the term prosôpon, ‘role’, had become a way of designating a 
person's character and the ‘performance’ expected of one. Epictetus makes it clear that a character in 
this sense is something that is partly determined by circumstances—one's role as a son, a citizen, and 
so on—but still more importantly, by one's choices and understanding of ‘who one is’ (cf. Diss. 1.2, 
2.10).”22  
 
 “[…] he insists that we are all owners of one supremely valuable thing—our minds or moral purposes 
or autonomy. This is not, of course, property in the material sense of the word, but it is fundamental to 
the way Epictetus conceptualizes the self. As he sees it, all human beings are alike in their natural 
ownership of the one thing that makes each of them essentially human—an autonomous mind and 
power of moral choice or assent. 
   What Epictetus calls self-ownership was the Stoics' most far-reaching contribution to their reflections 
on society, justice, and personal freedom.”23 
 
   Epictetus and the Stoics in general, following Aristotle up to a certain point24 put 
“the internal and external aspect of the actions on the same level.”25 Theory or in 
other words our own opinions and wills (ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα) is in some way a 
type of act. When I have some kind of προαίρεσις or internal dispositio/temper/Will 
and in general a certain use of impressions (φαντασίαι), I already act in a moral way, 
even if I am not causing any material changes to the external objects. As I have 
pointed, for Epictetus what counts is the moral intention/ the wills (δόγματα) and not 
the material acts. In his First of the Discourses Epictetus provides a clear explanation 
of the causes of the acts, and through this explanation we can see clearly his 
statements on the moral intension and the internal disposition: “And in a word, neither 
death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing anything or 
not doing; but our own opinions and our wills (ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα).”26 
 
 In the next chapter I will present the elements/causes that result the freedom of 
choice and the “Freedom of the Will” – a term that is not used in this context in 
Epictetus or any other philosopher before him, bur first appears in a later 





4.2.6 . Freedom of  choice or Freedom of choice of disposition?   
           Freedom with a positive or negative sign? 
 
           αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας, [μόνῃ] τὸ δυνηθῆναί ποτ' εἰπεῖν 
ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη, 
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμί διατεταγμένος. 28 
 
 
   As I mentioned in a previous chapter, Epictetus concludes that man is able to gain 
freedom through the use of the concepts of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.  
 
   What will be elaborated in this chapter is how from the treatment/use of these 
concepts, Epictetus succeeds in allowing margins of freedom for man, given that he 
also accepts a deterministic model cosmos (Destiny: Πεπρωμένη). His 
interpretation of freedom of choice and freedom in general will also be explained.  
 
   God makes dicisions about the course of events, therefore everything is 
predetermined according to the Will of God/ Nature: both the external events/facts 
that will happen to man and everything that man will choose internally. A very 
descriptive writing for this stance is the abstract from Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus29 
which Epictetus continuously repeats. In these excerpt, the help of Zeus is invoked in 
order for man to be able to live according to Zeus’ Will, by harmonising his own Will 
to that of Zeus. 
   I think that Epictetus succeeds in proposing a parallel existence of Destiny 
(Πεπρωμένη) and Freedom. In other words he succeeds to conclude that in a 
deterministically predefined World/Universe there does exist space for freedom. This 
is his unique proposal. A proposal which has its roots in the Early Stoics; Epictetus 
however brings this issue to a central point and treats it in detail. 
 
   In Chapter 2, I referred to various interpretations of the targeting of ἐφ' ἡμῖν and 
οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Based on these interpretations, I will proceed to explain more concretely 





   The achievement of a good internal disposition, which is consists of freedom from 
passions, liberty and tranquillity (ἀπάθεια, ἐλευθερία, ἀταραξία)31 of the soul, leads to 
better planed future with realistic goals (τέλος), that can be materialised. The 
establishment of the notions of ἐφ' ἡμῖν - οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, is identified with the 
establishment of a pattern of a life that is in accordance to God/ Nature, as perfectly 
expressed by Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus. Thus disappointments and failures of man are 
reduced and man comes even more close to the achievement of eudaimonia31, which 
is the ultimate goal of every cultural manifestation and of every philosophical theory, 
especially of every practical –therapeutic philosophical theory (as the Hellenistic ones 
are). Such a theory strives to make the future more certain, particularly if it is the 
future of the people of the Roman Empire. This is achieved via the guidance of the 
behaviour, the internal disposition and the acts (that is the internal and external acts) 
of the moral agent. 
 
 The external obstacles occur in every kind of movement that involves the body, for 
the very reason that the body itself is another external material thing. There are 
therefore two alternative solutions. The first is to avoid the obstacles by avoiding the 
acts with a positive sign. This, in other words, implies the performance only of acts 
with negative sign: this ends up to apraxia (total inactivity). The second, and the 
preferred solution is the indifference towards the external obstacles, which the body 
comes across (externalised act) and the pursuit of the achievement of freedom through 
the internalised acts. These are inherent to man in various forms: assent, intention, 
avoidance of act with a positive sign.  
 
   In the case of the second, the preferred solution the external obstacles cannot be 
conceived because the externalised acts, or otherwise the προαίρεσις, cannot be 
stopped even by God.32 God is the entity that predetermines the Destiny (Πεπρωμένη) 
and the natural order of events. Πεπρωμένη, therefore is not a problem for Epictetus, 
since only the events/ things, that are external to man, fall under its predetermination. 
By harmonising our life to the rules of Destiny, we place everything that it influences 
and determines in a ‘skinbag’ that Epictetus calls: τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. We then accept 
these with moral indifference. Namely, we have no moral responsibility towards 




conceptual pattern of Epictetus we can say that these do not belong to ἐφ' ἡμῖν but to 
the ἐπί τῆς Φύσεως.) 
 
   Man has been granted only a partial participation to the cosmic discourse (logos) 
since total participation would mean identification with this discourse, hence with 
Nature/ God. However, none of the participating beings can be identified with the 
whole. The partial participation of man can be placed in a second ‘skinbag’ that 
Epictetus calls: τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν. What is contained in this skinbag is not contained in the 
skinbag of God/ Nature and therefore in everything that is predetermined by Destiny 
(Πεπρωμένη). (They belong to the οὐκ ἐπί τῆς Φύσεως.) The same way that Nature is 
able to have power on what depends on it and predetermine it, we are equally able to 
have a complete freedom of choice over everything that is in our power (depends on 
us).  
 
   Our freedom of choice can be exercised only to anything that depends on us. 
Respectively the freedom of Nature will also be exercised upon what depends on it, 
which are these things that are out of our control. 
 
   Our participation in the cosmic logos has been misunderstood: It is not a 
participation to the same ἐφ' ἡμῖν and not participation to the same οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν as 
God/ Nature/ cosmic logos, but a participation to the same powers/ abilities. The 
powers are the faculties of the soul. The misunderstanding occurs because we believe 
that we participate in the Whole with our body, but for Epictetus the body acts as 
something external to the moral agent. The soul is corporeal, according to one 
interpretation: it does not correspond the passive part of the body, but is part of an 
active principle within the body. It is, in other words participant to divine forces. The 
divine forces are summarised in προαίρεσις. In conclusion, our common with Nature/ 
God power is the freedom of choice as a faculty and not as what the freedom consists 
of (the content of freedom). By ‘content’ I mean the things we can choose, which are 
the spectrum of things upon which we can exercise our freedom of choice. 
     
 
   This proposal for freedom has two characteristics. The first is that it is a concept of 




anything else than what is predetermined. It is a freedom that refers to anything that 
we cannot be hindered by external factors in choosing it, or be forced to choose it 
while we prefer to abstain.  
 
   I think that it is wrong to believe that in the case of the οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν we have no 
freedom at all, while in the case of the ἐφ' ἡμῖν we have a complete freedom. In short, 
the second characteristic is telling us  that in both cases we can have some freedom.  
 
   This freedom is about the choice of an internal disposition of the moral agent and 
not an unconditionally free choice of the internal or external state/course of things 
 
   In the case of the οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, this freedom is limited to a freedom of choice of 
disposition by the moral agent. This means the following: the moral agent wills 
whatever is happening, the way it happening, to happen exactly as it does. The 
options of the moral agent are two, and none of these two involves the freedom of the 
choice of how the external things (events) will happen and which ones will happen. 
The first choice is to live willing what is predetermined to happen, gaining thus 
ataraxia (tranquillity). The second choice is to oppose to what is happening and try to 
change it in vain, disturbing thus the peace of the soul.  
 
   In the case of the ἐφ' ἡμῖν, contrary to the οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, freedom can be expanded to 
a freedom of choosing or rejecting how and which internal things will happen. This is 
because it pertains to the internal things, hence the things that belong to the ἐφ' ἡμῖν. 
 
   Besides, the help Epictetus implies that we should ask from God, is not a request of 
such powers/ abilities so that we will be able to determine the process of things, but it 
is just request for some support to be given to us in our effort to treat appropriately 
our already granted powers/ abilities, so that even in the case of external events (οὐκ 
ἐφ' ἡμῖν) we will be able to achieve an internal freedom: namely, a freedom related to 
the internal impact of the external events. 
 
   In short, the inwardness (anything internal to the moral agent) is the only ‘place’ 




inwardness is where they are “placed” and on the basis of the above, it is proven that 
freedom exists somewhere and somehow. In the case of the οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν inwardness 
might not be their place in the way it is for the ἐφ' ἡμῖν, but it could indirectly become 
a kind of place, because whatever touches our soul is not external things, (material or 
immaterial), but the soul itself. The soul touches itself with the opinions and the wills 
(ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα), or, in other words, our ideas for things. Things themselves 
cannot touch anything but our body, since it is one of them, it belongs to the same 
‘place’ with them, which the external world. 
 
   The soul has the powers/ abilities to depend on its προαίρεσις, the choice of its 
impulses, desires and assents. Therefore if it can choose its disposition regarding the 
above (δηλαδή, τά προαιρετικά/ τά ἐφ' ἡμῖν/ its inwardness (internal), τό 
αὐτεξούσιον33), can also choose the opinions and our wills (ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα)  
towards them. That is the opinions and the relevant wills that the opinions entail. The 
external objects themselves as such are not compatible to the admissions of the soul. 
By this I mean that they can be externalised, that is to enter and influence the soul, 
only through the opinions and wills that man forms when in contact with them 
through his perceptive mechanism.    
    
 
   In conclusion whatever touches our soul,34 that is us as conscientious beings, is just 
our opinions and our wills for things and not the things themselves. It is up to us to 
treat these opinions and wills in such a way so that they will not disturb the peace of 
our soul. External things are lost due to some external cause (“ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν”), 
while ataraxia and apathy, that is the good internal disposition, is lost due to our own 
internal cause: 
 
“And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the will, and 
the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have them nor to lose them is shameful; but 
as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is shameful and matter of reproach and a 
misfortune. […] 
In the first place consider what hurt (βλάβη) is, and remember what you have heard from the 
philosophers. For if the good consists in the will (purpose, intention, προαιρέσει), and the evil also in 
the will, see if what you say is not this: What then, since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust 




(mentally think of) something of this kind? But where there is any detriment to the body or to our 
possession, there is harm there; and where the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is 
(you suppose) no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done an unjust act neither suffers 
in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, nor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than 
(security to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest and faithful or shameless and 
faithless, we care not the least, except only in the school so far as a few words are concerned. Therefore 
our proficiency is limited to these few words; but beyond them it does not exist even in the slightest 
degree.”35 
 
   This treatment concerns the going together of our “internal” Will with the 
“external” Will, which is the Will of God/ Nature. The powers/ abilities that God gave 
us are sufficient for this going together of our partiality (which is the commanding-
faculty and in general the partial soul/powers/prohairesis), with the corresponding 
universal ones. 
 
   As Sofronis Sofroniou outlines: “His teaching can be considered as an elaboration 
of his fundamental insight that morality and success and happiness consist in the 
realisation tan since we cannot do the impossible, i.e. change the world and since we 
cannot evade its inevitability and inconstancy and perishability and apparent sadness 
we should do the only possible thing, i.e. change ourselves, our minds and our values 
so as to be enabled to admire the design and beauty and wisdom and hidden goodness 
of the universe and become worthy and happy spectators and actors in it.”36   
 
 In addition if we undertake such an internal treatment of things we will also 
define our position as a philosopher or common person:  
 
“ταῦτα ἐπίσκεψαι. εἰ θέλεις ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι τούτων ἀπάθειαν, ἐλευθερίαν, ἀταραξίαν: εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ 
προσάγαγε. μὴ ὡς τὰ παιδία νῦν φιλόσοφος, ὕστερον δὲ τελώνης, εἶτα ῥήτωρ, εἶτα ἐπίτροπος 
Καίσαρος. ταῦτα οὐ συμφωνεῖ. ἕνα σε δεῖ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν εἶναι: ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ 
ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτοῦ ἢ τὸ ἐκτὸς ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔσω φιλοτεχνεῖν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔξω: τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἢ 
φιλοσόφου τάξιν ἐπέχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου.”37  
 
   What will be analysed in the next chapter is what kind of treatment should we 
exercise to our opinions and wills (ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα), in order to achieve a the 




all its determinism upon us, making all that it can depend on itself completely non-
dependable on us (οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν). 
 
4.2.7. The Character/ Psychology/ Psûche and the φαντασίαι’ of the moral 
agent as sufficient conditions for the Freedom of Choice of Disposition 
  
   The psychology of the individual at its totality is predetermined; thus the assent of 
the individual to an impression is also predetermined.  
 
   The assent of the individual is free, however, for the following reasons38: First, no 
external factor can hinder the individual from assenting to an impression or from 
assenting to the contrary one. Therefore no external factor can stop him from 
accepting on his own will what is already predetermined to happen even if his partial 
προαίρεσις/ Will does not will it. 
 
   Second, my impression itself with my disposition to assent to this impression, are 
sufficient conditions for the act of Assenting. Impression on its own would not suffice, 
because a different psychology (that is the internal world of another person), due to a 
different predetermined for this person psychology, would have acted otherwise. 
Hence the assent cannot be stopped by anything external, and so it merely depends on 
the moral agent.  
 
   The moral agent, as has already been mentioned, shrinks to an ‘ego’ that receives 
impressions. The desires and impulses that connect it to these impressions are 
something external to this agent/ ‘ego’. Therefore the moral agent becomes morally 
responsible, because its detachment from its own psychology/character (desires, 
passions, etc) and therefore from everything that links him with the impressions he 
receives, the opinions, the wills, and therefore all the external things, gives to the 
agent the freedom to choose to do otherwise.  
 
   In other words, the desires, as well as all the other faculties/powers that are 
contained in the Character/ Psychology/ Psûche of the agent, are to the agent what the 
impressions are to the rest of the external objects of the world. Hence, even the 




contact with the moral agent or ‘ego’, only through the impressions. So they do not 
force the agent more than any other impression and their characterisation as psychic 
does not imply any difference regarding the necessity and the determinism they 
exercise. This characterisation simply categorises them (ontologically) in relation to 
their substance, which is intangible/ psychic unlike the rest of the objects (even the 
body, its Will and, according to an interpretation, the Soul/ Psûche itself) which are 
corporeal/ material.  
 
   In other words the agent shrinks, in the sense that it excludes from its internal 
disposition its body and everything the body entails (desires, impulses, the Will, etc). 
As it is pointed out by T. Brennan: “Here again we see the conception of the agent in 
the process of shrinking to exclude the body and its desires, and this alienation leads 
to the reclassification of large portions of the agent's psychology. What was internal 
when it was my desire becomes external when it is my body's desire. The true self, the 
real me, is a rational soul, which will be most clearly revealed only after it is freed 
from the body. The boundary of ‘external hindrances’ advances inwards; when I act 
from my desire for food, this action is no longer fully up to me, but is symptomatic of 
the way that my body, which is not me, hinders my eternal soul, which is the real 
me.”39  
 
   What is taken onto consideration for the ‘measurement’ of the moral responsibility 
is the use of our impressions (φαντασίαι), and not our actions. Each time we assent to 
a certain impression, we automatically choose some type of action. This choice 
depends on us. The paradox is that this choice is predetermined due to our given 
Character/ Psychology/ Psûche. Therefore, the anything up to the level of our specific 
Character / Psychology is predetermined.  
 
   The moral intention is the criterion of the moral responsibility. The latter is 
analysed as the disposition of the voluntary assent to the deterministically specified 
and automatic, (due to our character/psychology), original assent and it completely 
depends on us. The Psychology/ Psûche/ inwardness/ the internal disposition is the 
one that makes the choice; we, as moral agents (our ‘ego’), can ONLY accept 
willingly/ voluntarily its choice or not. In other words, the ‘ego’/moral agent προ-




προαίρεσις: it pre- chooses whether to choose or not to choose, what is already 
deterministically chosen by the given Psychology/ Psûche of the agent. This faculty is 
not predetermined by any impression or Psychology/ Psûche. Hence if the agent uses 
appropriately the originally predetermined illiberal προαίρεσις, this could become a 
spark of freedom. In order for man to succeed its proper use, exercise is required40 
(άσκηση), as well as preparation (παρασκευή) and discipline (παιδεία). 
 
   On the contrary, the realisation of what we have chosen, after we have assented to 
it, does not depend on us, because it can be hindered by external factors. For this 
reason it was supported above that the action (ἔργον) does not constitute a criterion 
for the morality of the agent.  
 
   In conclusion assent is free and the agent is morally responsible. Hence,  freedom of 
the will is accepted by Epictetus due to the sufficiency of the impressions and the  
Character/ Psychology/ Psûche  for the freedom of choice of disposition, as long as 
this sufficiency is appropriately treated by the moral agent. In addition the purpose/ 
targeting of the distinction of ‘ego’ from the internal psychology of the agent (mainly 
the προαίρεσις and the Will), in my opinion is the following: to transform the 
compulsion that is accompanied by the Character/ Psychology/ Psûche to a simple 
necessity. I think that the abstract below is quite essential regarding the above 
conclusions and it constitutes a concise answer to the total of the issues posed in this 
paper:  
 
“A man’s moral character is the primary cause of his performing good or bad acts. Each act 
additionally requires a triggering cause, normally in the form of a sense-impression, since all acts are 
somehow responses to external circumstances. […] He must, especially when the apportionment of 
responsibility is at issue, distinguish himself from the chain of external influences. Thus fate, from his 
point of view, is the set of external causes which, by acting upon him, work to bring about their 
destined effects. But since these external causes are no more than triggering causes, he cannot hold 
them in any strong sense responsible for his actions, let alone sufficient to necessitate them. The 
primary cause is himself. […] was to concede that fate necessitates but to distinguish the kind of 
necessity involved from compulsion. On either version, answerability for our actions in no way 
requires an open future and might even be seriously jeopardized by one. What it requires is a proper 
system for apportioning responsibility between the relevant causal factors. For actions to be ‘in our 




through us. […] Our minds are fragments of the divine mind, and by lining up our own impulses with 




    
    According to Chrysippus:  
 
“And we say that the house-builder builds the house, in reference to that which is to be produced. So 
we say that the cloak is woven; for that which makes is the indication of the operation. That which 
makes is not the attribute of one, and the cause that of another, but of the same, both in the case of the 
cloak and of the house. For, in as far as one is the cause of anything being produced, in so far is he also 
the maker of it. Consequently, the cause, and that which makes, and that through which (δἰ ὅ), are the 
same. Now, if anything is a cause and that which effects, it is certainly also that through which. But if a 
thing is that through which, it does not by any means follow that it is also the cause. Many things, for 
instance, concur in one result, through which the end is reached; but all are not causes. For Medea 
would not have killed her children, had she not been enraged. Nor would she have been enraged, had 
she not been jealous. Nor would she have been this, if she had not loved. Nor would she have loved, 
had not Jason sailed to Colchi. Nor would this have taken place, had the Argo not been built. Nor 
would this have taken place, had not the timbers been cut from Pelion. For though in all these things 
there is the case of that through which, they are not all causes of the murder of the children, but only 
Medea was the cause. Wherefore, that which does not hinder does not act. Wherefore, that which does 
not hinder is not a cause, but that which hinders is. For it is in acting and doing something that the 
cause is conceived.”1 
 
   Epictetus employs the example of Medea2, in his attempt to prove that it is not 
possible for someone to consider something being to his greater interest than 
something else and not choose what seems to this person that serves his better interest. 
The measure for every act as far as man is concerned is the appearance (φαινόμενον)3. 
From that aspect Medea is morally responsible and the sole cause of her act, yet she is 
not to be censurable for this act (always according to Epictetus). Because it is not the 
blame but the pity that fits to a human that has been deluded by the appearances 
(φαινόμενα), and thus makes the wrong decisions regarding issues of the greatest 





   Medea is aware that her deed is “ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον”4, but she is not aware what is 
more profitable to her, because her ‘Rational-commanding Faculty’ (προαίρεσις) has 
been blinded by anger (θυμός). Thus is out of pure ignorance that she judged wrongly 
as to what is the more profitable to her: to succumb to her anger, in order to avenge 
her husband, or to follow her Reason and save her children; so she opted for the 
former:  
 
“[…]πάντως πέπρακται ταῦτα κου̉κ  ἐκφεύξεται (1064) 
[…] ἀλλά νικῶμαι κακοῖς. 
καì μανθάνω μέν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, 
θυμός δέ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, 
 ̒́ οσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς. (1077-1080)”5 
 
“Medea nunc sum; crevit ingenium malis. (910) 
[…]quid, anime, titubas? Ora quid lacrimae rigant 
variamque nunc huc ira, nunc illuc amor 
diducit? Anceps aestus incertam rapit; (937-939) 
[…] ira pietatem fugat 
iramque pietas – cede pietati, dolor. (943-944) 
[…] rursus increscit dolor 
et fervet odium, repetit invitam manum 
antiqua Erinys – ira, qua ducis, sequor. (951-953)”6  
 
   The clear statement by Medea that she cannot escape Fate is worth noting (“πάντως 
πέπρακται ταῦτα κου̉κ  ἐκφεύξεται”; “antiqua Erinys – ira, qua ducis, sequor”). This 
statement of hers serves as an example to the apparently contradictory proposal by 
Epictetus regarding the possibility of the parallel existence of Destiny and Freedom 
(Πεπρωμένη – Ελευθερία).7 A statement that is the fundamental proposal of this 
dissertation. 
 
   Therefore what Medea lacked was not the moral precondition for freedom but the 
cognitive (gnosiological) one8. The knowledge offered by the Rational Faculty 
(προαίρεσις), when not clouded by the passions (πάθη), is the knowledge that shows 
us that the power to achieve what we want does not lie ἔξωθεν9, (that is in the change 
and distortion of things according to our Will), but according to the Will of 




Rational Faculty (ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική). Hence the power to achieve what we want lies 
within us and it is ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική. The cognitive/ gnosiological precondition for 
the freedom of the Will, is a precondition that depends on us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν), for the very 
reason that it belongs to the προαίρεσις; namely, it belongs to the the moral agent’s 
choice of its internal disposition/ mood. In the Fourth Chapter, I attempted to support 
that Character/ Psychology/ Psûche and the use of the Impressions, constitute 
sufficient as well as necessary conditions for the choice of the disposition. 
 
   In conclusion, although Medea ignores which decision is in compliance to the  Will 
of the Nature/ God, she is considered as morally responsible for her act. As it was 
explained in the Third Chapter, the lack of knowledge or the delusion in relation of 
the Will of Nature, is in no way an alibi for Epictetus. The reason for this is that God/ 
Nature has provided humans with Rationality, so that they will be able to be aware of 
God’s Will. Under Spinoza’s terms, freedom becomes an imperative freedom for man 
thanks to the imperative knowledge of the will of God. It is therefore the choice of 
man himself, whether he will follow the right decision, (which he is able of being 
aware of through his Reason), or whether he will be led by his Passion.  
 
   Destiny (Πεπρωμένη) decides and predetermines what concerns the moral agent, 
disregarding its Will, yet the moral agent itself chooses either to resist or obey to what 
has been predetermined and there is no hope of changing. The final decision is 
exclusively up to man himself. According to the Stoics, man is not a moral 
automaton. The World we live in is not simply the only possible world, as it is 
according to Spinoza, but also The Best possible world of Leibniz.  
 
   The optimism of the Stoic Philosophy10 lies in the following: the cosmic 
deterministic plexus is governed by Rationality and Divine Providence together, since 
this plexus is identified with God himself, who is the a priori agent of Reason and 
Providence. Providence is necessary due to the axiom of the Stoics according to 
which Nature/God is governed by λόγος, hence it cannot but function in the best 
possible manner. The deterministic plexus of the world is considered to be governed 
by λόγος, in the sense that the rational structure and evolution of the World are the 




Cosmos in the perception of the ancients is a closed Cosmos, (making the time a 
cyclical time), the Eternal Recurrence of this Cosmos becomes also necessary. 
Eternal Recurrence is not subject to any kind of divine planning since God, contrary 
to Christianity, constitutes a part of this cosmic plexus and is also governed by the 
Natural Law. Eternal Recurrence lies in the fact that the present deterministic plexus 
is the only rational evolution that things might follow. Cosmos repeats itself because 
every previous Cosmos was perfect and God, on account of his providence, allows the 
continuous recurrence of the best possible world. 
 
   As A.A. Long writes, “the conflagration is providential since, sub specie 
aerernitatis, it preserves the present world by constantly reconstituting it.”11 The 
Ancient Stoics, Chrysippus mainly, perceive the eternal recurrence literally, in fact 
there are attempts to calculate recurrences and the date when the World and its 
recurrences will come to an end12. In the Late Stoa, however a more metaphoric 
interpretation is treated by Marcus Aurelius13. This philosopher puts eternal 
recurrence indifferently aside so that it will give its place and all its greatness to the 
present moment. Since this moment will be returning exactly the same it is concluded 
that the moment is identical, therefore whatever is the number of its past or future 
recurrence it provides nothing more to man than just one moment. As these moments 
accumulate they result to only one life.  
 
   In more recent years Nietzsche treats eternal recurrence in a similar manner. I think 
that Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche is something similar to Kant’s Categorical 
imperative. Where Kant states (and I quote in a free interpretation): “act in such a way 
so what you do (the choices of your actions) could become the universal law”, 
correspondingly Nietzsche states: “act in such a way so that the choices of your 
actions will be those you wanted to have in every return of yours to eternity”. In other 
words it has a metaphysic nuance, aiming to underscore the importance of our choices 
in every present moment. We have to be able to choose correctly because a wrong 
choice will cancel the tranquillity of the soul not only during some moments of the 
present life but throughout eternity, throughout an infinite number of lives in which 
we will force ourselves to live in misery. Nietzsche places the emphasis on selectivity. 




freedom of choice is not utopic for man. (Epictetus nowhere refers explicitly to 
eternal recurrence hence the parallelisms here are simply hypothetical.)  
 
   Christianity introduced a linearity of time by eradicating the eternal recurrence, 
since the way it proposes is that of the perfect completion after death. Jesus Christ 
abolished sin, hence the cyclicity of time becomes meaningless. For Kant there is a 
kind of eternal recurrence in the sense that the structure of the human mind remains 
eternally the same. Therefore the same noetic/ mental “Categories” return. Selectivity 
however does not constitute such category for Kant. So everything continuously 
returns and not only what man selects as worth of returning, which is what Nietzsche 
introduces.  
 
   The optimism of the Stoics underlines, above all, the power of Reason or Rational 
Faculty in man. Its power is so great that, on the basis of all that have been explained 
above, could even make the difference14 between an optimist and a pessimist. The 
reason for this is that we become optimists or pessimists depending on whether we 
choose to make our Reason to obey Nature (optimism) or resist its will (pessimism). 
If man does not have an optimistic attitude towards the World but keeps complaining 
to the deeds of God, then it would be better to retire from the whole fete; the door is 
open:  
 
“ἔξελθε, ἀπαλλάγηθι ὡς εὐχάριστος, ὡς αἰδήμων: δὸς ἄλλοις τόπον: δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ ἄλλους, 
καθάπερ καὶ σὺ ἐγένου, καὶ γενομένους ἔχειν χώραν καὶ οἰκήσεις, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ἂν δ᾽ οἱ πρῶτοι 





















1 Cf. Ioannes ab Arnim (collegit), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (SVF), I. 179:  
Diogenes Laert. VII 87: “διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος 
εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν· 
ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις”. 
Cic. de fin. IV 14 : “hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem, declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, 
convenienter naturae vivere”. 
 
See also, Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944, 
p. 210: “In any "persuasive definition" the term defined is a familiar one, whose meaning is both 
descriptive and strongly emotive. The purport of the definition is to alter the descriptive meaning of the 
term, usually by giving it greater precision within the boundaries of its customary vagueness; but the 
definition does not make any substantial change in the term's emotive meaning. And the definition is 
used, consciously or unconsciously, in an effort to secure, by this interplay between emotive and 
descriptive meaning, a redirection of people's attitudes.” 
 
2 Stoic philosophy has been accused of self contradictions since ancient time, two of the most 
representative examples are firstly, Plutarch’s Περί Στωικών εναντιωμάτων (De Stoicorum 
repugnantiis): cf. ‘‘Plutarch, The Contradictions of the Stoics’’ [Translation by E. Smith] in William 
W. Goodwin (ed.), Plutarch’s Morals (Translated from the Greek by several hands; Introduction by 
Ralph Waldo Emerson), vol. IV, Boston, Published by: Little, Brown, and Company, 1878, 428-477; 
and secondly, Cicero’s Paradoxa stoicorum: cf. ‘‘Marcus Tullius Cicero, Paradoxa stoicorum’’ in 
Marcus Tullius Cicero, De oratore, Vol. 2, Book III; together with De fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De 
partitione oratoria (translation by H. Rackham), London, 1948. 
Contemporary literature also discusses this topic, i.e. cf. Ivan Gobry, “La Contradiction du 
Stoïcism” in Chypre et Les Origines du Stoïcism (Actes du Colloque Paris, 12-13 Mai 1995), 




«Περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν» 
 
1 Epictetus, Discourses, 4.1.128-131: For the Greek Text, cf. Heinrich Schenkl (ed.), Epicteti 
Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae, Leipzig B. G. Teubner, 1916. [Provided online by 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/]. 
Translation (in English): George Long (translator), The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion 
and Fragments, London, George Bell and Sons, 1890 [Provided online by 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/].  
[Where a translation is given in English, for the rest of this paper, the translation that will be 
used is the aforementioned one by G. Long, except if stated otherwise.] 
For an alternative translation cf. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (translator), The Works of Epictetus: 
His Discourses, in Four Books, the Enchiridion, and Fragments, New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 
1890 [Provided online by http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/]. 
 
2 Discourses, 1.1. (“Περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν”)  
 
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (EN III.3 and 5) and Eudemian Ethics (EE II.6 1223a1–9 and II.10): cf. 
Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001, 280. 
 
4 Cf., Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, 330-332. 
 
5 Enchiridion, 1.2.  
 




7 Ibid., 1.1; Translation: [G. Long]: “OF things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power 
are opinion (ὑπόληψις), movement towards a thing (ὁρμή), desire, aversion (ἔκκλισις, turning from a 
thing); and in a word, whatever are our own acts: not in our power are the body, property, reputation, 
offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts.”  
 
8 Cf. Discourses, 1.1.4.: [G. Long.] “What faculty then will tell you? That which contemplates both 
itself and all other things. And what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that 
we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this 
gift, and examines all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden things are 
beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of 
appearances.” 
 
9 Ibid., 1.1.10-12: “"Ἐπίκτητε, εἰ οἷόν τε ἦν, καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ἄν σου καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον ἐποίησα 
ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον. νῦν δέ, μή σε λανθανέτω, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν σόν, ἀλλὰ πηλὸς κομψῶς 
πεφυραμένος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠδυνάμην, ἐδώκαμέν σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν 
ὁρμητικήν τε καὶ ἀφορμητικὴν καὶ ὀρεκτικήν τε καὶ ἐκκλιτικὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὴν χρηστικὴν ταῖς 
φαντασίαις, ἧς ἐπιμελούμενος καὶ ἐν ᾗ τὰ σαυτοῦ τιθέμενος οὐδέποτε κωλυθήσῃ, οὐδέποτ᾽ 
ἐμποδισθήσῃ, οὐ στενάξεις, οὐ μέμψῃ, οὐ κολακεύσεις οὐδένα.” 
 
10 For a translation of the fragment SVF, II.836, see A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic 
Philosophers, p. 315-316. Regarding the Parts and the Faculties of the Soul cf. Jean –Baptiste 
Gourinat, Οι Στωικοί για την ψυχή, 33-42; A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, 
Sceptics, p. 170-174 [ch. 4: (vi): “The Soul and Human Nature”] and p. 175-178 [ch. 4: (vii): “Human 
rationality and the passions”]; A. A. Long, “Stoic Psychology” (ch.17), in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. 
Mansfeld & M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, 560–84; A.A. Long, “Representation and the self in Stoicism” (ch. 
6), in S. Everson (ed.), Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991; LS, vols.1-2, (ch. 53: “Soul”); Julia Annas, “The Stoics” (Part Two), in 
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994. 
 
11 Cf. Discourses, 1.1.1-6. Regarding the faculties of the Soul and their relation to the rational faculty: 
Ιbid., 1.1.12, 23-24 (προαίρεσις), 1.17.21-29; 3.22.103-106; 
 
4.1.68-75:  
“[…] Is any man able to make you assent to that which is false—No man—In the matter of assent then 
you are free from hindrance and obstruction. […] And who can compel you to desire what you do not 
wish?—No man—And to propose or intend, or in short to make use of the appearances which present 
themselves, can any man compel you?—He cannot do this: but he will hinder me when I desire from 
obtaining what I desire.—If you desire any thing which is your own, and one of the things which 
cannot be hindered, how will he hinder you?—He cannot in any way—Who then tells you that he who 
desires the things that belong to another is free from hindrance?”;  
 
4.1.83-84: 
“[…] and what else have you been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own 
and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the things subject to 
hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the philosophers? was it that you may never the 
less be unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be 
without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief 
from that which is present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are within the 
power of the will, as being good and present, you have a proper and regulated desire: but of the things 
which are not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to 
that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty.”  
 
See also the following books: Jean –Baptiste Gourinat, Οι Στωικοί για την ψυχή, 33-42; A. A. Long, 
Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 170-174 [ch. 4: (vi): “The Soul and Human Nature”] and p. 175-178 [ch. 4: 
(vii): “Human rationality and the passions”].  
 
12 Jean –Baptiste Gourinat, Οι Στωικοί για την ψυχή, 124-125: «είναι ο κόσμος της πράξης.». [The 





13 Ibid., 124: «είναι ο κόσμος του πάθους». 
 
14 Cf. Discourses, 1.17.21-23; 3.22.104. 
 
15 Ibid., 1.1.12. A brief, comprehensive and introductory presentation of the δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις 
χρηστική is given by Sofronis Sofroniou, “The value system of Epictetus”, Επετηρίς: Φιλοσοφικόν 
Παράρτημα II: Στωικισμός, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985, 71-73. 
 
16 Cf. Discourses, 3.1.25-26:  
“ἄνθρωπος εἶ: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ θνητὸν ζῷον χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις λογικῶς. τὸ δὲ λογικῶς τί ἐστιν; 
φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως. τί οὖν ἐξαίρετον ἔχεις; τὸ ζῷον; οὔ. τὸ θνητόν; οὔ. τὸ χρηστικὸν 
φαντασίαις; οὔ. τὸ λογικὸν ἔχεις ἐξαίρετον: τοῦτο κόσμει καὶ καλλώπιζε: τὴν κόμην δ᾽ ἄφες τῷ 
πλάσαντι ὡς αὐτὸς ἠθέλησεν.” 
 
“You are a human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances 
rationally.  
But what is meant by 'rationally'? Conformably to nature and completely.  
What then do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the animal part? No. Is it the condition of mortality? 
No. Is it the power of using appearances? No. You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing: 
adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose.” 
 
17 Ibid., 1.1.17:  
“δεῖ τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν βέλτιστα κατασκευάζειν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν. "πῶς οὖν πέφυκεν;" ὡς 
ἂν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ.” 
 
“We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the rest 
according to their nature.  
What is their nature then? As God may please.” 
 
18 Ibid., 1.6.10-13: 
“ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν: ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή, καθ᾽ ἣν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς 
αἰσθητοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνομέν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν καὶ 
συντίθεμεν τάδε τινὰ δι᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία μεταβαίνομεν ἀπ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα τινὰ οὕτω πως 
παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαί τινας καὶ διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην; ἢ 
ἐξηγησάσθωσαν ἡμῖν τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τούτων ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε τὰ οὕτω θαυμαστὰ καὶ τεχνικὰ 
εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι.  
 
Τί οὖν; ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν μόνων γίνεται ταῦτα; πολλὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἐξαιρέτως χρείαν εἶχεν τὸ λογικὸν 
ζῷον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὑρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα. ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς γινομένοις 
ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. ἐκείνων χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς 
χρωμένων ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῇ χρήσει.” 
 
“ If they do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding according to which, when we 
meet with sensible objects, we do not simply receive impressions from them, but we also select 
something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things 
or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even 
this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman? If not so, let them 
explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and 
like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion? 
 
What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal 
had peculiarly need; but you will find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they then 
understand what is done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another: God had 
need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances.” 
 
19 Ibid., 1.6.17-21: 
“οὗ τοίνυν ἡ κατασκευὴ μόνον χρηστική, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι ὁπωσοῦν ἀπαρκεῖ: οὗ δὲ καὶ 
παρακολουθητικὴ τῇ χρήσει, τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν μὴ προσῇ οὐδέποτε τεύξεται τοῦ τέλους. τί 




ὥστε τυρὸν φέρειν, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ παραπλησίῳ, πρὸς ἃ τίς χρεία τοῦ παρακολουθεῖν ταῖς 
φαντασίαις καὶ ταύτας διακρίνειν δύνασθαι; τὸν δ᾽ ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν 
ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν.  
 
διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ καταλήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν 
μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δὲ ἐφ᾽ ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις. κατέληξεν δ᾽ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ 
παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει. ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀποθάνητε.” 
 
“In those animals then whose constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal 
(man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless there be the due exercise of the 
understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be 
eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for 
which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? 
But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His works; and not only a spectator of 
them, but an interpreter.  
 
For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he 
ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature ends in contemplation 
and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without 
having been spectators of these things.” 
 
20 Ibid., 1.14.5-6: 
“ἀλλὰ τὰ φυτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα οὕτως ἐνδέδεται τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ συμπέπονθεν, αἱ ψυχαὶ δ᾽ 
αἱ ἡμέτεραι οὐ πολὺ πλέον; ἀλλ᾽ αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε 
αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα, οὐ παντὸς δ᾽ αὐτῶν κινήματος ἅτε οἰκείου καὶ συμφυοῦς ὁ 
θεὸς αἰσθάνεται;” 
 
“But are plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole, and are not our souls much 
more? and our souls so bound up and in contact with God as parts of Him and portions of Him; and 
does not God perceive every motion of these parts as being his own motion connate with himself?” 
 
21 E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, (translation from German: Rev. Oswald J. Reichel), 
London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892 [new and revised edition], 217. 
 
22 Discourses, 3.3.1-2: “Ὕλη τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ σῶμα δ᾽ ἰατροῦ καὶ 
[ἀπ]ἀλείπτου, ὁ ἀγρὸς γεωργοῦ ὕλη: ἔργον δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις κατὰ 
φύσιν. πέφυκεν δὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ὥσπερ τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐπινεύειν, πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος ἀνανεύειν, πρὸς τὸ 
ἄδηλον ἐπέχειν, οὕτως πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρεκτικῶς κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐκκλιτικῶς, πρὸς 
δὲ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν οὐδετέρως.” 
 
“The material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for the 
physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); the land is the matter for the husbandman. The 
business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature 
of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which 
is uncertain; so it is its nature to be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion from the 
evil; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent.” 
 
T.W. Higginson translates ‘Ὕλη’ as ‘chief concern’: cf. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (translator), 
The Works of Epictetus: His Discourses, in Four Books, the Enchiridion, and Fragments, New York: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1890: “The chief concern of a wise and good man is his own Reason. […]” 
 
23 Regarding the use of this term before Epictetus, cf. Robert Dobbin, “Προαίρεσις in Epictetus”, 
Ancient Philosophy, vol. 11, Mathesis Publications, 1991, 111-115. 
 
24 Discourses, 2.23.11. 
 
25 Ibid., 2.23.18. 
 




27 Ibid., 2.23.19: “προαίρεσιν δὲ τί ἐμποδίζειν πέφυκεν; ἀπροαίρετον οὐδέν, αὐτὴ δ' ἑαυτὴν 
διαστραφεῖσα. διὰ τοῦτο κακία μόνη αὕτη γίνεται ἢ ἀρετὴ μόνη” and 2.23.28-29: “τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ 
κἀκείνῃ χρώμενον καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις καὶ μικραῖς καὶ μεγάλαις δυνάμεσιν∙ τούτου κατορθωθέντος 
ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, ἀποτευχθέντος κακὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται∙ παρ' ὃ ἀτυχοῦμεν, εὐτυχοῦμεν, 
μεμφόμεθ' ἀλλήλους, εὐαρεστοῦμεν, ἁπλῶς ὃ λεληθὸς μὲν κακοδαιμονίαν ποιεῖται, τυχὸν δ' 
ἐπιμελείας εὐδαιμονίαν.” 
 
28 Ibid., 1.12.9. 
 
29 Ibid., 1.12.15: “ἐνταῦθα οὖν μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ κυριωτάτου, τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ὡς ἔτυχεν 
ἐφεῖταί μοι θέλειν; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς 
γίνεται. πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων.” 
 
“Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am 
permitted to will inconside- rately? By no means; but to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that 
every thing may happen as it does. And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed them 
[…]” 
 
30 Ibid., 1.12.17: “Ταύτης οὖν τῆς διατάξεως μεμνημένους ἔρχεσθαι δεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, οὐχ ἵν᾽ 
ἀλλάξωμεν τὰς ὑποθέσεις οὔτε γὰρ δίδοται ἡμῖν οὔτ᾽ ἄμεινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς 
ὡς ἔχει καὶ πέφυκεν αὐτοὶ τὴν γνώμην τὴν αὑτῶν συνηρμοσμένην τοῖς γινομένοις ἔχωμεν.” 
 
“Remembering then this disposition of things, we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may change 
the constitution of things,—for we have not the power to do it, nor is it better that we should have the 
power,—but in order that, as the things around us are what they are and by nature exist, we may 
maintain our minds in harmony with the things which happen.” [Long] 
 
“Mindful of this appointment, we should enter upon a course of education and instruction, not in order 
to change the constitution of things,- a gift neither practicable nor desirable,-but that, things being as 
they are with regard to us, we may have our minds accommodated to the facts.” [Higginson] 
 
31 Ibid., 1.12.21-23: “τίς οὖν ἡ κόλασις τοῖς οὐ προσδεχομένοις; τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἔχουσιν. 
δυσαρεστεῖ τις τῷ μόνος εἶναι; ἔστω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τοῖς γονεῦσιν; ἔστω κακὸς υἱὸς καὶ 
πενθείτω. δυσαρεστεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις; ἔστω κακὸς πατήρ. "βάλε αὐτὸν εἰς φυλακήν." ποίαν φυλακήν; 
ὅπου νῦν ἐστιν. ἄκων γάρ ἐστιν: ὅπου δέ τις ἄκων ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνο φυλακὴ αὐτῷ ἐστιν. καθὸ καὶ 
Σωκράτης οὐκ ἦν ἐν φυλακῇ, ἑκὼν γὰρ ἦν.” 
 
“What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be what they are. Is any person 
dissatisfied with being alone? let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? let him be a bad 
son, and lament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? let him be a bad father. Cast him into prison. What 
prison? Where he is already, for he is there against his will; and where a man is against his will, there 
he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly.” [Long] 
 
“What, then, is the punishment of those who do not so accept them? To be as they are. Is any one 
discontented with being alone? Let him remain in his desert. Discontented with his parents? Let him be 
a bad son; and let him mourn, Discontented with his children? Let him be a bad father. Shall we throw 
him into prison? What prison? Where he already is; for he is in a situation against his will, and 
wherever any one is against his will, that is to him a prison, -just as Socrates was not truly in prison, for 
he was willingly there.” [Higginson] 
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Content and targeting (aim) of ἐφ' ἡμῖν and οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν  
 
1 See “Chapter 3” of this Paper. 
 
2 Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, 343.  
 
3 Regarding “targeting”, see “Chapter 2.2” of this Paper. 
 
4 Cf., Susanne Bobzien, “The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem”, 
Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy, The Netherlands, Brill, Volume XLIII, 1998, 133-137, 
160-167 and Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, 331-338. 
 
5 Susanne Bobzien, “The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem”, 133. 
 
6 Ibid., 134.  
 
7 Ibid., 134. 
 
8 Ibid., 135-136. 
 
9 Ibid., 135 and Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
2005, 291. 
 
10 Susanne Bobzien, “The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem”, 135. 
 
11 Ibid., 135. 
 
12 Cf., Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life, 293-294. 
  
13 Cf., Plato, Phaedo, 66 b-d. 
 
14 Cf., Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate, 294. 
 
15 Ibid., 291-293 and Tad Brennan, “Fate and Free Will in Stoicism: A Discussion of Susanne Bobzien, 
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, United States, 
Oxford University Press: Ed. David Sedley, Volume XXI, Winter 2001, 259-286. 
 
16 Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate, 294. 
 
17 Ibid., 292-293. 
 
18 Ibid., 294. 
 
19 Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life, 297; also cf., Susanne Bobzien, “The Inadvertent Conception and Late 
Birth of the Free-Will Problem”, 160-161. 
 
20 Cf., Discourses, 1.4 (“Περὶ προκοπῆς”: “Of progress or improvement”). 
 
21 This Theory refers to Theories of the Will of Philosophers of the Modern Era, such as Spinoza, 
Arthur Schopenhauer and, partly, Friedrich Nietzsche.  
 
22 Regarding the content of ἐφ' ἡμῖν and οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, see “Chapter 1.3” and “Chapter 2.1” of this 
Paper. 
 
23 For a detailed presentation of the differences, cf. Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in 
Stoic Philosophy, 330-332 and Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life, 300-304.  
 




25 Μυρτώ Δραγώνα – Μονάχου (Myrto Dragona-Monachou), “Η προαίρεσις στον Αριστοτέλη και στον 
Επίκτητο” (“Prohairesis in Aristotle and Epictetus”), 308. See also Epictetus, Discourses, 1.29.58; 
2.14.23; 1.6.19-21. 
 
26 Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, 338.  
 
27 A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2006 [Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007], p.13. 
 
28 George Koumakis, “Education and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy”, Diotima: Review of Philosophical 
Research, 20: Le Stoïcisme et la Culture, A Publication of the Hellenic Society for Philosophical 
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The epictetean προαίρεσις as the freedom of choice of the internal disposition 
 
1 Enchiridion, 9. 
 
2 Discourses, 1.29.47: “[…] μή τι τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ κακόν” 
 
3 Ibid., 1.12.9: “ἐλεύθερος γάρ ἐστιν, ᾧ γίνεται πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ὃν οὐδεὶς δύναται 
κωλῦσαι.” 
 
4 Ibid.,1.12.21-27: "ἑορτὴν καὶ πανήγυριν καὶ οὕτως πάντα εὐαρέστως δέχεσθαι. τίς οὖν ἡ κόλασις τοῖς 
οὐ προσδεχομένοις; τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἔχουσιν.” 
 
5 Ibid., 4.1.108-110: “— Τί οὖν μ᾽ εἰσῆγεν ἐπὶ τούτοις; — Καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιεῖ σοι, ἔξελθε: οὐκ ἔχει χρείαν 
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ἐπιθειάζωσιν, ὑμνῶσι δὲ τὴν πανήγυριν. τοὺς ἀταλαιπώρους δὲ καὶ δειλοὺς οὐκ ἀηδῶς ὄψεται 
ἀπολελειμμένους τῆς πανηγύρεως: οὐδὲ γὰρ παρόντες ὡς ἐν ἑορτῇ διῆγον οὐδ᾽ ἐξεπλήρουν τὴν 
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ἀναίσθητοι καὶ ὧν ἔτυχον καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεων, ἃς εἰλήφασι πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, μεγαλοψυχίας, 
γενναιότητος, ἀνδρείας, αὐτῆς τῆς νῦν ζητουμένης ἐλευθερίας. — Ἐπὶ τί οὖν εἴληφα ταῦτα; — 
Χρησόμενος. — Μέχρι τίνος; — Μέχρις ἂν ὁ χρήσας θέλῃ. — Ἂν οὖν ἀναγκαῖά μοι ᾖ; — Μὴ 
πρόσπασχε αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. σὺ αὐτὰ αὑτῷ μὴ εἴπῃς ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν.” 
 
“— Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions? — And if the conditions do not 
suit you, depart. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the 
festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with 
hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see 
absent from the great assembly (πανήγυρις); for they did not when they were present behave as they 
ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, 
fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received 
for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are 
now inquiring about, freedom.—For what purpose then have I received these things? —To use them—




attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary: do not say to yourself that they are necessary, 
and then they are not necessary.” [Long] 
 
“"Why, then, did he bring me into the world upon these conditions?" Well, if it is not worth your while, 
depart. He has no need of a discontented spectator. He wants such as will share the festival; make 
part of the chorus; who will extol, applaud, celebrate the solemnity. He will not be displeased to see the 
wretched and fearful dismissed from it. For when they were present they did not behave as at a festival, 
nor fill a proper place, but lamented, found fault with the Deity, with their fortune, with their 
companions. They were insensible both of their advantages and of the powers which they received for 
far different purposes, - the powers of magnanimity, nobleness of spirit, fortitude, and that which now 
concerns us, freedom. "For what purpose, then, have I received these things?" To use them. "How 
long?" As long as he who lent them pleases. If, then, they are not necessary, do not make an idol of 
them, and they will not be so; do not tell yourself that they are necessary, when they are not.” 
[Higginson] 
 
6 Ibid., 4.1.109. 
 
7 Ibid., 4.1.109. 
 
8 Ibid., 4.1.110. 
 
9 Ibid., 4.1.101: “τί οὖν θεομαχῶ; τί θέλω τὰ μὴ θελητά, τὰ μὴ δοθέντα μοι ἐξ ἅπαντος ἔχειν; ἀλλὰ 
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you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not 
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Consulship, (translated by C.D. Yonge), London, Henry G. Bohn, 1853, pp. 279-280.   
 
12 Alfred de Vigny, Les destinées : poèmes philosophiques, Michel Lévy frères, Librairie nouvelle 
(Paris), 1864, verses 70-75 [Provided online by Gallica Digital Library: 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k70632p.image.r=vigny.f4.langEN#]. Also see E. Moutsopoulos, 
“Η αντιστροφή της έννοιας της ειμαρμένης στην ποίηση του Vigny”, Επετηρίς: Φιλοσοφικόν 
Παράρτημα II: Στωικισμός, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985, pp. 1-7. 
 
13 For a detailed analysis of this topic, cf. Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic 
Philosophy, 334-338 ; Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life, 298-304; Μυρτώ Δραγώνα – Μονάχου, “Η 
προαίρεσις στον Αριστοτέλη και στον Επίκτητο”, 305-306; A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic 
philosophers, (Volume 1), p. 386-394 (ch. 62); Maria E. Koutlouka, “La liberté dans le stoïcisme”, 
Επετηρίς: Φιλοσοφικόν Παράρτημα II: Στωικισμός, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985, 123-125; 
F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics, Great Britain, The Bristol Press, 1989 [1st: 1975], 101-108. 
 
14 Cf., Discourses, 1.12.32-5: “οὐ μᾶλλον εὐχαριστεῖς τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι σε ἐπάνω τούτων ἀφῆκαν ὅσα 
μηδ᾽ ἐποίησαν ἐπὶ σοί, μόνον δ᾽ ὑπεύθυνον ἀπέφηναν τῶν ἐπὶ σοί; γονέων ἕνεκα ἀνυπεύθυνον 
ἀφῆκαν: ἀδελφῶν ἕνεκα ἀφῆκαν, σώματος ἕνεκα ἀφῆκαν, κτήσεως, θανάτου, ζωῆς. τίνος οὖν 
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Also, cf. Discourses, 1.11.33: “καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν 





“And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing 
anything or not doing; but our own opinions and our wills (δόγματα).” 
 
“Do you not rather thank the gods that they have allowed you to be above these things which they have 
not placed in your power, and have made you accountable only for those which are in your power? As 
to your parents, the gods have left you free from responsibility; and so with respect to your brothers, 
and your body, and possessions, and death and life. For what then have they made you responsible? For 
that which alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why then do you draw on yourself 
the things for which you are not responsible? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to yourself.” 
 
15 Ibid.,1.12.34; 1.17.21-24; 4.8.1-4;  
 
4.4.44: “μηδέποτε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν μήτ᾽ ἐπαινεῖτε μήτε ψέγετε, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δογμάτων. ταῦτα γάρ 
ἐστι τὰ ἴδια ἑκάστου, τὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις αἰσχρὰς ἢ καλὰς ποιοῦντα.” 
 
“For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his 
opinions (principles); fur these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or 
good.” 
 
16 Ibid.,1.17.23-24: “οὐδὲ εἷς. ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τὸ προαιρετικὸν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον 
ἀνανάγκαστον ἀπαραπόδιστον; ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ ἄλλως ἔχει; καὶ τίς ὁρμὴν 
νικῆσαι δύναται ἢ ἄλλη ὁρμή; τίς δ᾽ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν ἢ ἄλλη ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις;” 
 
“You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from 
compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? 
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οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ τὰ ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δ᾽ ἀδούλευτον καὶ 
ἀνυπότακτον.”;  
 
and 3.23.4-6:  
“λοιπὸν ἡ μέν τίς ἐστι κοινὴ ἀναφορά, ἡ δ᾽ ἰδία.  
πρῶτον ἵν᾽ ὡς ἄνθρωπος. ἐν τούτῳ τί περιέχεται; μὴ ὡς πρόβατον, † εἰ βλαπτικῶς † καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ὡς 
θηρίον.  
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ἀναγιγνώσκοντος ὑμῖν", σκέψαι πρῶτον μὴ εἰκῇ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν. εἶτ᾽ ἂν εὕρῃς, ὅτι ἀναφέρεις, σκέψαι, εἰ 
ἐφ᾽ ὃ δεῖ.”  
 
“Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular purpose.  
First of all, we must act as a man. What is comprehended in this? We must not be like a sheep, though 
gentle; nor mischievous, like a wild beast.  
But the particular end has reference to each person's mode of life and his will. The lute-player acts as a 
lute-player, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rhetorician as a 
rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear me read to you: take care first of all that you are not 
doing this without a purpose; then if you have discovered that you are doing this with reference to a 
purpose, consider if it is the right purpose.”  
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“[…] how then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character? How, he replied, 
does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in 
defence of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is 
immediately conjoined: and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them.” 
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εἰς δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὐλόγου καὶ ἀλόγου κρίσιν οὐ μόνον ταῖς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίαις συγχρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 
κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος.”  
 
“But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good 
and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in 
order to learn how to adapt the preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several things 
conformably to nature. But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the 
estimates of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to each person.” 
 
Regarding ‘discipline’ (παιδεία) see also George Koumakis, «Education and Freedom in Stoic 
Philosophy», 51-53. 
 
21 Cf. Μυρτώ Δραγώνα – Μονάχου, “Η προαίρεσις στον Αριστοτέλη και στον Επίκτητο”, 305-306; for 
more detailes see Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life, 298-304 and Jean –Baptiste Gourinat, Οι Στωικοί για 
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26 Discourses, 1.11.33: “καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων 
αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ πράττειν τι ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα.” 
 
“And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing 
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 “ἄγου δέ μ᾽, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ᾽ ἡ Πεπρωμένη, 
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